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Abstract
Scholars have wondered for a long time whether the language of quan-
tum mechanics introduces a quantum notion of truth which is formalized
by quantum logic (QL) and is incompatible with the classical (Tarskian)
notion. We show that QL can be interpreted as a pragmatic language LPQ
of assertive formulas, which formalize statements about physical systems
that are empirically justified or unjustified in the framework of quantum
mechanics. According to this interpretation, QL formalizes properties
of the metalinguistic notion of empirical justification within quantum me-
chanics rather than properties of a quantum notion of truth. This conclu-
sion agrees with a general integrationist perspective that interprets non-
standard logics as theories of metalinguistic notions different from truth,
thus avoiding incompatibility with classical notions and preserving the
globality of logic. By the way, some elucidations of the standard notion
of quantum truth are also obtained.
Key words: pragmatics, quantum logic, quantum mechanics, justifi-
ability, global pluralism.
1 Introduction
Several years ago a formalized pragmatic calculus LP was constructed, based
on some deep ideas by Dalla Pozza [Dalla Pozza and Garola 1995]. This calcu-
lus extends a classical propositional calculus stemming from Frege’s ideographic
language, in which the assertion sign is introduced as a constitutive part of
the formulas of the logical calculus [Frege, 1879, 1891, 1893, 1918; Reichen-
bach, 1947; Stenius, 1969]. LP is obtained indeed by considering a classical
propositional calculus (CPC) with standard connectives and formation rules for
radical formulas, and adding, besides the assertion sign, pragmatic connectives
and formation rules for assertive formulas. The radical formulas of LP are then
supplied with a classical semantic interpretation, while the assertive formulas are
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supplied with a pragmatic interpretation in terms of the notion of justification
(or proof ).
The first aim of this construction is providing a general framework in which
the conflict between the classical and the verificationist theories of truth and
meaning can be settled by integrating their perspectives. The verificationist
theories of truth, indeed, have been criticized by many scholars, mainly because
they assume that a proposition is true if and only if asserting it is justified, which
leads to identify the notions of truth and justification [Russel, 1940, 1950; Car-
nap, 1949; Popper, 1969; Haack, 1978]. There are strong intuitive arguments
that support the need of avoiding this identification. In fact, the pragmatic
notion of justification presupposes the semantic notion of truth, for a proof of a
sentence consists in showing that the truth value of the sentence is true. More-
over, there are factual and logico-mathematical sentences that are undecidable,
i.e., epistemically inaccessible, though they have a truth value [Carnap, 1932;
Russell, 1940]. A sharp distinction between justification and truth is therefore
introduced in LP via the assertion sign, which has a purely pragmatic role and
cannot be identified with an alethic modality operator (it formalizes indeed the
metalinguistic notion of proof, which cannot be reduced to any acceptable notion
of truth, in the object language). Correspondingly, there are deep syntactic
differences between the part of LP formalizing the properties of the classical
notion of truth (radical formulas) and the part of LP formalizing the general
properties of the notion of justification (assertive formulas).
The second aim of the construction of LP is showing that the integration
of the notions of truth and justification realized in LP allows one to settle,
in particular, the conflict between classical and intuitionistic logic in a unified
perspective. To this end two partially overlapping structures, ACPC and AIPC
(where A stands for assertive) are singled out in LP that are isomorphic to
CPC and to an intuitionistic propositional calculus (IPC), respectively. The
pragmatic interpretation of LP induces, through the isomorphism of AIPC and
IPC, an interpretation of IPC which recovers in a natural way the standard
Brower-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation of this calculus in terms of
logical proof [Troelstra and Van Dalen, 1988]. The construction of LP can thus
help enlightening “the mysteries of the intuitionistic truth” [Van Dalen, 1986].
The general perspective underlying the construction of LP is resumed in the
Introduction of the paper by Dalla Pozza and Garola as follows.
“The purpose of our interpretation is mainly philosophical. Indeed
we aim to settle the conflicts between classical and intuitionistic
logic, and between the classical (correspondence) and the intuitionis-
tic (verificationist) conceptions of truth and meaning (see Dummett,
1977, 1978, 1979, 1980; Prawitz, 1977, 1980, 1987); this will be done
by introducing an integrated perspective which preserves both the
globality of logic (in the sense of the global pluralism, which admits
the existence of a plurality of mutually compatible logical systems,
but not of systems which are mutually incompatible or rivals, see
Haack 1978, Chapter 12) and the classical notion of truth as corre-
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spondence, which we may consider explicated rigorously by Tarski’s
semantic theory (see Tarski 1933, 1944).”
The ideas underlying the construction of LP have started a lively debate
on pragmatics and related topics. Based on Dalla Pozza’s distinction between
descriptive and expressive notions of norms, Bellin and Dalla Pozza [2002], Bellin
and Ranalter [2003] and Ranalter [2006] have developed a pragmatic theory
of obligations, assertions and causal implication; White [2008] has presented
a formal theory of actions; Carrara and Chiffi [2013] have applied the logic
for pragmatics framework to knowability paradoxes. Moreover intuitionistic
dualities have been explored from the viewpoint of the logic for pragmatics,
where co-intuitionism has been regarded as a logic of hypotheses in relation with
the intuitionistic logic of assertions [Bellin and Biasi 2004; Biasi and Aschieri
2008; Bellin, 2014; Bellin 2015; Bellin et al., 2015a; Bellin et al., 2015b].
The quotation above from the paper by Dalla Pozza and Garola also reminds
us that there are several research fields in which non-classical notions of truth
are introduced, raising conflicts with classical logic (CL) similar to the conflict
between intuitionistic logic and CL. A typical example is provided by quantum
logic (QL), with its non-classical structure that is claimed to imply a highly
problematical notion of quantum truth (a huge literature exists on this topic; the
interested reader can find a general review of the attempts at constructing a logic
for the language of quantum mechanics till the early seventies in the classical
book by Jammer [1974], and more updated treatments and bibliographies in the
books by Redei [1998] and Dalla Chiara et al. [2004]). One can then wonder
whether some of the foregoing conflicts can be settled by resorting to LP and
embedding into it the non-classical structures that are considered, as in the
case of intuitionistic logic. The answer is positive, as such an embedding has
been realized for Girard’s linear logic [Girard, 1987] by Bellin and Dalla Pozza
[2002]. We aim to show in this paper that a similar result can be achieved if
QL is considered. The general scheme provided by LP applies indeed not only
when the notion of proof is specified to be a logical proof, as in the case of IPC,
but also if it is specified to be an empirical proof (or verification, or empirical
justification) in the framework of a specific theory.
Let us resume the main lines of our work.
By considering the notion of truth in quantum mechanics, we observe in Sect.
2 that our program has to face a deep problem from the very beginning. Indeed,
truth and verification are strictly entangled in the standard interpretations of
quantum mechanics. To avoid this problem we introduce a generalization of
LP in Sect. 3 (still denoted by LP , by abuse of language) admitting a partial
classical semantics for radical formulas. This semantics can be particularized
to fit in with various different interpretations of quantum mechanics. If one
adopts a suitable orthodox interpretation or a modal interpretation, our notion
of truth weakens the classical notion but does not conflict with it. If one accepts
the generalization and reinterpretation of quantum mechanics (extended seman-
tic realism, or ESR, model) proposed by us together with some collaborators
[Garola, 2015; Garola and Sozzo, 2009, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012; Garola
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and Persano, 2014; Garola et al., 2014, 2015], our notion of truth coincides with
the classical notion. Based on this generalization of LP , we select in Sect. 4 a
sublanguage LPQ of L
P in which the notion of proof is specified to be the notion
of empirical proof in quantum mechanics. We then show in Sect. 5 that this
specification induces a homomorphism of LPQ onto QL: hence, an interpretation
of QL as a structure formalizing the properties of the metalinguistic notion of
justification according to quantum mechanics, not the properties of a notion of
truth alternative to the classical notion.1 This result holds for each of the in-
terpretations of QM mentioned above (orthodox, modal and ESR model), hence
we can claim that our aim has been reached.
We conclude our work in Sect. 6 by comparing our result with a similar
result obtained by ourselves together with another author [Garola and Sozzo,
2013], showing the advantages of the approach proposed in this paper.
To close, we note that our generalization of LP is important also indepen-
dently of quantum mechanics, because it makes LP a more powerful tool for
coping with a variety of problems.
2 On the notion of truth in quantum mechanics
Busch et al. [1991, 1996] distinguish two basic classes of interpretations of quan-
tum mechanics, the class of statistical and the class of realistic interpretations.
According to the statistical interpretations quantum mechanics deals only with
probabilities of measurement outcomes, and no reference to single items of phys-
ical systems (briefly, individual objects in the following) is allowed. According
to the realistic interpretations quantum mechanics deals with individual objects
and their physical properties.
The statistical interpretations imply an instrumentalist view that has been
severely criticized from an epistemological viewpoint. For instance, Timpson
[2006] writes:
“The point is, instrumentalism is not a particularly attractive or
interesting interpretive option in quantum mechanics, amounting
more to a refusal to ask questions than to take quantum mechanics
seriously. It is scarcely the epistemologically enlightened position
that older generations of physicists, suffering from positivistic hang-
overs, would have us believe.”
We add that nowadays experimental physicists often claim that they can
deal with individual objects, not only with statistical ensembles.
1This procedure does not strictly match the procedure adopted in [Dalla Pozza and Garola,
1995] to recover intuitionistic logic within LP . Indeed the axioms of AIPC (which make AIPC
isomorphic to IPC) are sentences of LP that are pragmatically valid (p-valid) in LP , for they
characterize a notion of logical proof. Some of the axioms that characterize the quantum
notion of proof are instead sentences of LP
Q
that are not p-valid. We therefore avoid a purely
axiomatic approach, which would make our task uselessly complicate.
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The class of the realistic interpretations, on the other side, is very broad.
In fact, the requirement that quantum mechanics deals with individual objects
characterizes a very weak form of realism, which does not imply any wave or
particle model for individual objects nor necessarily entails ontological committ-
ments (one could indeed interpret the term “individual object” as “activation
of a preparing procedure” [Ludwig, 1983]). Hence this class includes both stan-
dard interpretations and reinterpretations/modifications of quantum mechanics
that are realistic in a stronger sense (as Bohm’s theory, many worlds interpre-
tation, GRW theory, etc.). To avoid misunderstandings we therefore call the
interpretations of this class individual rather than realistic interpretations in
the following.
Whenever an individual interpretation is adopted, however, the measure-
ment problem arises, which was known since the birth of quantum mechanic
and is clearly formalized by some famous “no-go” theorems, as Bell-Kochen-
Specker’s [Bell, 1966; Kochen and Specker, 1967)] and Bell’s [Bell, 1964], stating
the contextuality and the nonlocality (i.e., contextuality at a distance) of quan-
tum mechanics, respectively (see, e.g., [Mermin, 1993]). In short, the result of a
measurement of a physical property on an individual object in a quantum state
2 is not prefixed according to quantum mechanics, but it depends on the set
of (compatible) measurements that are simultaneously performed on the indi-
vidual object (even at a distance, in the case of measurements performed on
an individual object that is an item of a composite system whose component
parts are far away). Of course, this typical feature of quantum mechanics does
not follow because of flaws or errors in the measurement devices (the mea-
surements are supposed to be exact). Hence, generally, no truth value can be
assigned to sentences attributing physical properties to individual objects in a
given state without taking into account the set of measurements that are per-
formed. Thus, truth and verification by means of measurements could not be
separated in quantum mechanics, whose language would require the adoption
of a (non-classical) verificationist theory of truth.
The feature of quantum mechanics described above raises a deep problem,
as we have anticipated in Sect. 1. It implies in fact that the general scheme
provided by the original formulation of LP does not fit in with an individual
interpretation of quantum mechanics, because no truth assignment could be
2We recall that “quantum states” and “physical properties” can be considered as theo-
retical terms of the language of quantum mechanics which can be operationally interpreted
as follows. A quantum state SQ corresponds to a subset of physically equivalent prepara-
tion procedures belonging to a set of preparation procedures associated with Ω. A physical
property E corresponds to a subset of physically equivalent dichotomic registering devices
belonging to a set of dichotomic registering devices associated with Ω. Each device r of the
latter subset, if activated in succession with the activation of a preparation procedure p in the
subset corresponding to SQ, performs a measurement of E on an item of Ω prepared by p,
that is, on an individual object a in (the quantum state) SQ, after which a either displays E
or not. In this sense we say that E is testable [Beltrametti and Cassinelli, 1981; Ludwig, 1983;
Garola and Sozzo 2014] (we remind, however, that there are physical properties in quantum
mechanics that are incompatible, in the sense that they cannot be tested conjointly). We add
that quantum states are usually divided into two disjoint classes, the class of pure quantum
states and the class of mixed quantum states, or mixtures.
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defined on the set of radical formulas of LP (whenever these formulas are inter-
preted as sentences of the language of quantum mechanics) independently of the
justification value of the corresponding assertive formulas. However, we main-
tain that this problem can be avoided by introducing a suitable generalization
of LP . Indeed, for every quantum state SQ of a physical system there are ob-
servables whose values can be predicted with probability 1, independently of the
measurement context (to be precise, all observables that admit SQ as an eigen-
state). Hence one can associate with SQ a subset of objective properties, that
is, a subset of physical properties that are possessed with probability 1 or 0 by
every individual object a whose state is SQ, independently of any measurement.
One can then assign a truth value that does not depend on the measurement
context to each sentence attributing one of these physical properties to a: truth
value true if the probability is 1, truth value false if the probabiliity is 0. Thus
one obtains a noncontextual quantum partial truth assignment associated with
SQ. Hence truth and verification can be distinguished if one restricts to the
subset of objective properties.
Bearing in mind the above argument, we will generalize LP by admitting
truth assignments on radical formulas that are not defined everywhere (the
partial classical semantics mentioned in Sect. 1). This generalization fits in
well with those standard interpretations of quantum mechanics that consider
real (or actual) in the quantum state SQ every physical property E such that
the probability p(SQ, E) associated by quantum mechanics to the pair (SQ, E) is
1 [Jauch, 1968; Piron, 1976; Busch et al., 1991, 1996; Aerts, 1999]. We call these
interpretations standard realistic interpretations in the following, because their
proposers usually maintain that they express a realistic philosophical position.
Our generalization of LP fits in well also with other interpretations of quan-
tum mechanics that introduce new sets of states besides quantum states. We
refer in particular to the modal interpretations of quantum mechanics (see the
bibliography in [Lombardi and Dieks, 2014]). In these interpretations the dy-
namical states correspond to the quantum states. But a further set of value
states is introduced, and the set of all sentences attributing a physical property
to an individual object a that have a truth value is determined by the value
state of a. This truth assigment is consistent with the quantum partial truth
assignment introduced above but it is defined on a broader set of sentences.
However, every truth assigment associated with a value state is still partial, and
can be seen as an instantiation of the generalized semantics introduced in LP .
Finally, our generalization of LP is compatible also with the ESR model
proposed by ourselves together with some collaborators in the papers quoted
in Sect. 1. This model in fact generalizes quantum mechanics and circumvents
the “no-go” theorems by reinterpreting quantum probabilities as conditional on
detection rather than absolute. Contextuality and nonlocality are thus avoided.
Hence, truth values are defined for every quantum state and for all sentences
of the language of quantum mechanics according to classical rules and indepen-
dently of the measurement context. This truth assigment is a borderline case
of the quantum partial truth assignment introduced above because it is defined
everywhere. Hence it can be considered as an instantiation of the semantics
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provided in the original version of LP , no generalization being needed. It is
interesting, however, to observe that one can construct hidden variables models
for the ESR model in which microscopic states are introduced that play a role
analogous to the role of value states in the modal interpretations: the main
difference is that the truth assigments associated with the microscopic states
are not partial but defined everywhere [Garola et al., 2015].
3 The generalized pragmatic language LP
Let us summarize sintax, semantics and pragmatics of a pragmatic language
LP which generalizes the language denoted by the same symbol in the paper by
Dalla Pozza and Garola [1995].
Alphabet. The alphabet AP of LP contains as descriptive signs the propo-
sitional letters p, q, r,...; as logical-semantic signs the connectives q, ∧, ∨, →
and ↔; as logical-pragmatic signs the assertion sign ⊢ and the connectives N ,
K, A, C and E; as auxiliary signs the round brackets (,).
Radical formulas. The set ψR of all radical formulas (rfs) of L
P is made
up by all formulas constructed by means of descriptive and logical-semantic
signs, following the standard recursive rules of classical propositional logic. We
denote by φR the subset of all rfs consisting of a propositional letter only (atomic
formulas).
Assertive formulas. The set ψA of all assertive formulas (afs) of L
P is made
up by all rfs preceded by the assertive sign ⊢ (elementary afs), plus all formulas
constructed by using elementary afs and following standard recursive rules in
which N , K, A, C and E take the place of q, ∧, ∨, → and ↔, respectively. We
denote by φA the subset of all elementary afs of ψA.
Semantic interpretation. Let us introduce a family {σS}S∈S , where S is a
set of states which play the role of possible worlds in Kripkean semantics and
σS is a function which maps a subset φRS of φR (the domain of σS) onto the
set {1, 0} of truth values (1 standing for true and 0 for false). We assume that
φR = ∪S∈SφRS , so that, for every α ∈ φR, at least one state S exists such that
α ∈ φRS . Then, for every S ∈ S, let us extend σS to the set ψRS ⊆ ψR of all rfs
which contain only atomic formulas that belong to φRS , following the standard
truth rules of classical propositional logic. We call assignment function this
extension, denote it by σeS , and call semantic interpretation of L
P the family
{σeS}S∈S . We stress that we do not assume that φRS is a proper subset of φR: if
φRS = φR, then ψRS = ψR and σ
e
S reduces to a classical assignment function. In
general, however, {σeS}S∈S can be considered as a weakened classical semantics
for LP .
Pragmatic interpretation. Whenever a semantic interpretation {σeS}S∈S is
given, a pragmatic interpretation of LP is defined as a family {piS}S∈S , where
piS is a pragmatic evaluation function which maps ψA onto the set {J, U} of
justification values (J standing for justified and U for unjustified). We assume
that each piS satisfies the following justification rules (where α and δ play the
role of metalinguistic variables), which refer to {σeS}S∈S and are based on the
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informal properties of the metalinguistic concept of proof in natural languages.
JR1. Let S ∈ S and α ∈ ψR. Then, piS(⊢ α) = J if α ∈ φRS and a proof
exists that σeS(α) = 1, piS(⊢ α) = U otherwise.
JR2. Let S ∈ S and δ ∈ ψA. Then, piS(Nδ) = J if a proof exists that it is
impossible to prove that piS(δ) = J , piS(Nδ) = U otherwise.
JR3. Let S ∈ S and δ1, δ2 ∈ ψA. Then,
(i) piS(δ1Kδ2) = J iff piS(δ1) = J and piS(δ2) = J ,
(ii) piS(δ1Aδ2) = J iff piS(δ1) = J or piS(δ2) = J ,
(iii) piS(δ1Cδ2) = J iff a proof exists that piS(δ2) = J whenever piS(δ1) = J ,
(iv) piS(δ1Eδ2) = J iff piS(δ1Cδ2) = J and piS(δ2Cδ1) = J .
Let us add some terminology and comments on JR1-JR3.
First of all, for every S ∈ S and δ ∈ ψA we briefly say in the following that
δ is justified (unjustified) in S whenever piS(δ) = J (U).
Secondly, let us recall that rules JR2, JR3 (iii) and JR3 (iv) make reference
to a notion of proof that belongs to a higher logical level with respect to the
notion of proof involved in rules JR1, JR3 (i) and JR3 (ii) [Dalla Pozza and
Garola, 1995]. To make this point clear, let us concentrate on JR2 (JR3 (iii)
and JR3 (iv) will not be needed in the following) and let us consider an example.
Let S ∈ S and α ∈ φRS . Then, stating that ⊢ α is unjustified means that we
do not possess any proof of α, but does not prohibit that a proof of α can be
produced: hence it does not imply that N ⊢ α is justified. The af N ⊢ α is
instead justified iff a proof exists that a proof of α cannot be produced: hence,
in particular, if a proof exists that α is false. Thus, piS(N ⊢ α) = J implies
piS(⊢ α) = U , but the converse implication does not hold.
Thirdly, let us note that the following correctness criterion holds in LP
because of JR1.
CC. Let S ∈ S and α ∈ ψRS . Then, piS(⊢ α) = J implies σ
e
S(α) = 1.
4 The quantum pragmatic language LPQ
As we have anticipated in Sect. 1, we aim to pick out in this section a sub-
language of LP and specify the notion of proof as empirical proof in quantum
mechanics. For the sake of clearness we will proceed by steps.
4.1 Alphabet and formation rules
The quantum pragmatic language LPQ is the sublanguage of L
P defined by the
following syntactic restrictions.
R1. The set ψ
Q
R of all rfs of L
P
Q is the subset φR = ∪S∈SφRS of atomic rfs
of LP .
R2. The set ψ
Q
A of all afs of L
P
Q is the set of all afs of L
P in which only rfs
in ψQR and the logical-pragmatic signs ⊢, N and K occur.
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Because of R1 and R2, the set ψ
Q
A of afs of L
P
Q is made up by all formulas
constructed by means of the following recursive rules.
(i) Let α ∈ ψQR. Then ⊢ α ∈ ψ
Q
A.
(ii) Let δ ∈ ψQA. Then Nδ ∈ ψ
Q
A.
(iii) Let δ1, δ2 ∈ ψ
Q
A. Then, δ1Kδ2 ∈ ψ
Q
A.
The restrictions expressed by R1 and R2 are obviously introduced to make
it possible to contrive an intended interpretation of LPQ in terms of quantum
physics. In order to justify R1, R2 and our further assumptions on L
P
Q, let us
discuss this interpretation in some details.
4.2 The intended interpretation of LPQ.
Let Ω be a physical system, characterized in quantum mechanics by a set E of
(first order) physical properties, let U be a set of individual objects and let.P(U)
be the power set of U . For every E ∈ E and a ∈ U , we write E(a) to formalize
the informal sentence “the individual object a has the physical property Eα”
(to avoid proliferation of symbols we do not distinguish here between a physical
property and the first order predicate expressing it).
The set S of states of LPQ can be interpreted as the set of all quantum states
of some standard realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics, or as the set of
all value states of some modal interpretation, or with the set of all microscopic
states in the ESR model (Sect. 2). We do not specify one of these interpretations
at this stage, for we wish our treatment to be as general as possible.
For every interpretation of S we introduce a mapping
ext : S ∈ S −→ extS ∈ P(U)
such that {extS}S∈S is a partition of U , and say that extS is the extension
of S (of course, extS depends on the interpretation of S that has been chosen).
Furthermore, for every a ∈ U we say that “a is in the state S” whenever a ∈
extS. Then we provide a physical interpretation of the rfs of LPQ by assuming
that a bijective mapping exists
I : α ∈ ψQR −→ Eα ∈ E
such that the following semantic condition holds.
SC. Let α ∈ ψQR , S ∈ S, and let a ∈ extS. Then, α ∈ ψ
Q
RS = φRS and
σS(α) = 1 (0) if and only if the sentence Eα(a) is true (false) according to the
interpretation of S that is adopted.
The semantic condition SC introduces different semantic interpretations of
LPQ, depending on the interpretation of S that has been chosen. In any case SC
implies that Eα(a) takes the same truth value for every individual object in the
state S.
The intended interpretation of the afs of LPQ is now immediate if the term
proof in JR1-JR3 is meant as empirical proof, that is, a proof following from
quantummechanics, which is the physical theory that is considered in this paper.
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Bearing in mind the intended interpretation above and footnote 2, it is ap-
parent that R1 in Sect. 4.1 is introduced to select only rfs that have a truth value
for some state S and can be interpreted as testable, or verifiable, sentences, i.e.,
sentences such that physical procedures exist which test their truth value (which
does not always occur, because of incompatibility of properties, in the case of
nonatomic, or molecular, rfs; note that a similar restriction has been introduced
by Dalla Pozza and Garola [1995] when recovering intuitionistic propositional
logic within LP ). R2 is introduced instead for the sake of simplicity, since only
the pragmatic connectives N and K are relevant to our goals in this paper.
4.3 The semantics of LPQ
The semantics of LPQ is obtained by restricting the assignment functions defined
on ψR to ψ
Q
R = φR. Hence, for every S ∈ S, the assignment function σ
e
S reduces
to σS and its domain ψ
Q
RS ⊆ ψ
Q
R coincides with φRS . Moreover, the semantic
condition SC requires us to add the following semantic principle.
SP. Every assignment function σS defined on ψ
Q
R must preserve the truth
values and the relations among truth values of rfs of LPQ established by the laws
of quantum mechanics via the intended interpretation of LPQ.
To illustrate SP let us supply an example.
Let α1, α2 ∈ ψ
Q
R , S ∈ S, and for every a ∈ extS let the laws of quantum
mechanics imply that Eα2(a) is true whenever Eα1(a) is true. Then, σS must
be such that, if α1 ∈ ψ
Q
RS and σS(α1) = 1, then α2 ∈ ψ
Q
RS and σS(α2) = 1.
The semantic principle SP does not provide, however, any explicit rule for
establishing whether a rf α ∈ ψQR has a truth value in a given state S, and
whether this value is true or false. To make SP more explicit, let us take into
account the possible interpretations of the set S mentioned in Sect. 4.2.
Let us firstly interpret S on the set of all pure quantum states3 and let us
discuss in some details the quantum partial truth assigment introduced in Sect.
2. Let us consider a state S ∈ S and a sentence of the form E(a), with E ∈ E and
a ∈ extS. As we have seen in Sect. 2, one assigns a truth value to E(a) which
is independent of the measurement context if E is objective in the quantum
state S, that is, if the probability p(E, S) associated by quantum mechanics to
the pair (E, S) is 1 (truth value true) or 0 (truth value false). Therefore, let
us consider the set ES = E
T
S ∪ E
F
S , with E
T
S = {E | E ∈ E , p(E, S) = 1} and
EFS = {E | E ∈ E , p(E, S) = 0}. Bearing in mind the mapping I introduced in
Sect. 4.2 and condition SC, we obtain that, for every α ∈ ψQR, α ∈ ψ
Q
RS iff
I(α) ∈ ES , and σS(α) = 1 (σS(α) = 0) iff I(α) ∈ E
T
S (I(α) ∈ E
F
S ). Otherwise,
σS(α) is not defined, that is, α does not belong to ψ
Q
RS . This specification of the
way in which truth values are assigned can be restated in terms of set-theoretical
conditions on the assignment functions of the family {σS}S∈S . To this end, let
us consider the set E of all physical properties of a physical system Ω. It is well
3See footnote 2. We consider here and in the following only pure quantum states to avoid
the more complicated formalism required to deal with mixtures.
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known that in quantum mechanics E is the support of a lattice structure L(E) =
(E ,⊥ ,⋓,⋒), usually called standard (sharp) quantum logic. In this logic ⊥, ⋓
and ⋒ are considered as quantum logical connectives. The symbol ⊥ denotes an
involutory unary operation on E called orthocomplementation. The symbols ⋓
and ⋒ denote join and meet, respectively, in L(E) 4. This lattice is orthomodular
but not distributive (it also has some further mathematical properties that do
not interest us here) [Beltrametti and Cassinelli, 1981]. Moreover, quantum
mechanics associates a subset SE ⊆ S of states with every E ∈ E in such a way
that the set SE = {SE | E ∈ E}, partially ordered by the set inclusion ⊆, is a
lattice L(SE ) = (SE ,⊆) = (SE ,
⊥ ,⋓,⋒) isomorphic to L(E), and the following
properties hold.
(i) For every E ∈ E ,
S
E
⊥ = S⊥E .
(ii) Let ∩ and ∪ denote set theoretical intersection and union, respectively.
Then for every E,F ∈ E ,
SE⋓F = SE ⋓ SF = SE ∩ SF ,
SE⋒F = SE ⋒ SF ⊇ SE ∪ SF .
The truth assigments introduced above can now be restated in set-theoretical
terms by referring to the lattice L(SE). Indeed it can be shown in quantum
mechanics that, for every E ∈ E and S ∈ S, E ∈ ETS (E
F
S ) if and only if S ∈ SE
(S⊥E ) [Garola and Sozzo, 2013]. Hence, for every a ∈ extS, a truth value of E(a)
is defined if and only if S ∈ SE ∪ S
⊥
E , which is true if and only if S ∈ SE , false
if and only if S ∈ S⊥E . This result can be transformed into an explicit rule for
any σS ∈ {σS}S∈S , as follows.
TR. Let α ∈ ψQR and S ∈ S. Then, α ∈ ψ
Q
RS if and only if S ∈ SEα ∪ S
⊥
Eα
,
and σS(α) = 1 (0) if and only if S ∈ SEα (S ∈ S
⊥
Eα
).
The truth rule TR provides a set-theoretical semantic interpretation {σS}S∈S
of LPQ that follows from the general principle SP whenever S is interpreted as the
set of all quantum states of some standard realistic interpretation of quantum
mechanics.
Let us now interpret S as the set of all value states in a modal interpretation
of quantum mechanics (Sect. 2) and let us consider the semantic interpretation
{σS}S∈S in this case. Let a ∈ U and let us put E(a)= {E(a) | E ∈ E}. Then, a
belongs to the extension of some value state and the subset of all sentences of
E(a) that have a truth value is generally broader than the set of all sentences of
E(a) that have a truth value according to the semantic interpretation discussed
above. Moreover, whenever truth values of E(a) ∈ E(a) are assigned by both
interpretations, they coincide. But it must be stressed that quantum mechanics
can predict the truth value of E(a) if and only if E(a) has a truth value according
4We introduce here the symbols ⋓ and ⋒ in place of the symbols ∧ and ∨ that are usually
introduced in quantum logic to denote meet and join, respectively, in the lattice L(E). We
indeed want to avoid the (mis)interpretation of these symbols as classical “and” and “or”,
respectively.
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to the interpretation of S as a set of quantum states (which correspond to the
dynamical states in the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics).
Finally, let us interpret S as the set of all microscopic states in the ESR
model (Sect. 2). In this case the semantic interpretation {σS}S∈S is such that,
for every S ∈ S, ψRS = ψR: hence it is a classical semantics for L
P
Q. If one
considers an individual object a ∈ U , then a belongs to the extension of some
microscopic state and all sentences of the set E(a) defined above have a truth
value. Moreover, the truth value of a sentence E(a) ∈ E(a) coincides with the
value of E(a) according to the interpretation of S as a set of quantum states
(which correspond to the macroscopic states in the ESR model) whenever the
latter value is assigned. But it must be stressed that also in this case quantum
mechanics predicts the truth value of E(a) if and only if E(a) has a truth value
according to the latter interpretation of S.
4.4 The pragmatics of LPQ
Proceeding as in Sect. 4.3, the pragmatics of LP is obtained by restricting each
pragmatic evaluation functions piS defined on ψA to ψ
Q
A (this restriction will
still be denoted by piS to avoid proliferation of symbols). Moreover, in the case
of elementary afs of LPQ we specify the notion of justification as empirical proof
by introducing the following pragmatic principle.
PP. Let S ∈ S and α ∈ ψQR. Then piS(⊢ α) = J if α ∈ ψ
Q
RS and the laws of
quantum mechanics allow to prove, via intended interpretation, that σS(α) = 1,
piS(⊢ α) = U otherwise.
The pragmatic principle PP entails that only the interpretation of S as a
set of quantum states is relevant at a pragmatic level. Indeed, it asserts that
an elementary af ⊢ α is justified if and only if the sentence Eα(a) (with a an
individual object in the state S), which corresponds to the atomic rf α via the
mapping I (Sect. 4.2), can be proven to have truth value true. But such a proof
is possible only if the truth value of Eα(a) is assigned by a quantum partial
truth assigment, that is, by the truth assigment associated with a quantum
state (Sect. 2). Quantum mechanics indeed can predict only these truth values
(Sect. 4.3).
Bearing in mind the above remark, we restrict to the interpretation of S as
a set of quantum states in the following, and no further mention of value states
or microscopic states will be done.5
The notion of justification as empirical proof then extends to afs of ψQA that
are not elementary via rules JR2 and JR3.
5The notion of proof specified by PP is empirical in the sense that a proof requires the use
of physical laws. However, it can be considered empirical also in a different sense, because
the same proof can be obtained by means of measurements. It can be shown in fact that a
quantum partial truth assigment assigns a value true (false) to a sentence E(a), with a in the
state S, if and only if one can perform a measurement of E on a without modifying S [Garola
and Sozzo, 2004].
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The pragmatic principle PP does not provide, however, any explicit rule for
establishing whether the elementary af ⊢ α is justified or unjustified in a given
state S. To make PP more explicit, let us show that the intended interpretation
in Sect. 4.2 and PP imply that the pragmatics of LPQ can be expressed in set-
theoretical terms. To this end, and bearing in mind the symbols introduced in
Sects. 4.2 and 4.3, we restate PP as follows.
PP′. Let S ∈ S and let α ∈ ψQR. Then, piS(⊢ α) = J if S ∈ SEα , piS(⊢
α) = U if S /∈ SEα .
The justification rule PP′ specifies piS on the set of all elementary afs of L
P
Q
and constitutes the starting point for our task. In fact, we can now introduce a
mapping
f : δ ∈ ψQA −→ Sδ ∈ L(SE ),
which associates a pragmatic extension Sδ with every assertive formula δ ∈
ψQA, defining f by means of the following recursive rules.
(i) Let α ∈ ψQR. Then, f(⊢ α) = S⊢α = SEα .
(ii) For every δ ∈ ψQA, f(Nδ) = SNδ = Sδ
⊥.
(iii) For every δ1, δ2 ∈ ψ
Q
A, f(δ1Kδ2) = Sδ1Kδ2 = Sδ1 ⋓ Sδ2 .
The pragmatic evaluation function piS can then be calculated by assuming
the following recursive justification rules.
JRQ1 . Let S ∈ S and α ∈ ψ
Q
R . Then, piS(⊢ α) = J if S ∈ S⊢α, piS(⊢ α) = U
if S /∈ S⊢α.
JRQ2 . Let S ∈ S and δ ∈ ψ
Q
A. Then, piS(Nδ) = J if S ∈ SNδ, piS(Nδ) = U
if S /∈ SNδ.
JRQ3 . Let S ∈ S and δ1, δ2 ∈ ψ
Q
A. Then, piS(δ1Kδ2) = J if S ∈ Sδ1Kδ2 ,
piS(δ1Kδ2) = U if S /∈ Sδ1Kδ2 .
Rules JRQ1 -JR
Q
3 specialize JR1-JR3, respectively, in our present context.
They are suggested by the following arguments.
Rule JRQ1 . From PP
′and (i).
Rule JRQ2 . Let α ∈ ψ
Q
RS . Then we must consider three alternatives, that is,
S ∈ S⊢α, S ∈ S
⊥
⊢α and S /∈ S⊢α∪S
⊥
⊢α. If S ∈ S⊢α, hence S /∈ S
⊥
⊢α = SN(⊢α), then
⊢ α is justified in S because of JRQ1 : therefore no proof exists that ⊢ α cannot
be justified, which implies that N(⊢ α) is unjustified. If S ∈ S⊥
⊢α = SN(⊢α),
then S ∈ S⊥Eα because of (i), hence α is false (σS(α) = 0) because of the TR rule
(Sect. 4.3): it follows that a proof exists that ⊢ α cannot be justified in S, which
implies that N(⊢ α) is justified in S. If S /∈ S⊢α∪S
⊥
⊢α, then α has no truth value
according to the TR rule, that is, according to the quantum truth assignment.
Nevertheless a value can be actualized by suitable measurements, and it can
be true), or α can have a truth value according to the modal interpretation of
quantum mechanics and it has a truth value in the ESR model. Hence no proof
of α is supplied by quantum mechanics, but no proof exists that ⊢ α cannot be
justified in S, which implies that N(⊢ α) is unjustified in S.
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Rule JRQ3 . Let α1, α2 ∈ ψ
Q
RS . Then the af (⊢ α1)K(⊢ α2) is justified if and
only if ⊢ α1 and ⊢ α2 are justified, that is, if and only if S ∈ S⊢α1 and S ∈ S⊢α2 :
hence, if and only if S ∈ S⊢α1 ∩ S⊢α2 = S⊢α1 ⋓ S⊢α2 = S(⊢α1)K(⊢α2).
5 The pragmatic interpretation of quantum logic
Bearing in mind the definition of the mapping f in Sect. 4.4, the justification
rules JRQ1 -JR
Q
3 can be unified by the following rule.
JRQ. Let S ∈ S and δ ∈ ψQA. Then, piS(δ) = J if S ∈ Sδ, piS(δ) = U if
S /∈ Sδ.
Based on JRQ, one can introduce a preorder (binary, transitive) relation ≺
on ψQA.
OR. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ ψ
Q
A. Then, δ1≺δ2 if and only if, for every S ∈ S, piS(δ1) =
J implies piS(δ2) = J .
It follows from JRQ and OR that δ1≺δ2 if and only if Sδ1 ⊆ Sδ2 . It is
then apparent that the mapping f is an order homomorphism of (ψQA ,≺) onto
(SE ,⊆). Since f(Nδ) = Sδ
⊥ and f(δ1Kδ2) = Sδ1 ⋓ Sδ2 , we briefly say that
f makes the connectives N and K correspond to the lattice operations ⊥ and
⋓, respectively. Furthermore, let us introduce a derived connective AQ in LPQ,
defined by the equation
δ1A
Qδ2 = N((Nδ1)K(Nδ2)).
Then we get
f(δ1A
Qδ2) = (S(Nδ1)K(Nδ2))
⊥ = (S
⊥
δ1
⋓ S
⊥
δ2
)⊥ = Sδ1 ⋒ Sδ1 .
Hence, f makes the connective AQ correspond to the lattice operation ⋒.
Thus, our homomorphism shows that the quantum logical connectives ⊥, ⋓
and ⋒ can bear an interpretation as logical-pragmatic signs rather than logical-
semantic signs.
The above interpretation can be made more cogent by introducing an equiv-
alence relation ≈ on ψQA, defined as follows.
ER. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ ψ
Q
A. Then, δ1≈δ2 if and only if δ1≺δ2 and δ2≺δ1 (equiv-
alently, for every S ∈ S, piS(δ1) = J if and only if piS(δ2) = J).
JRQ and ER imply indeed that δ1≈δ2 if and only if Sδ1 = Sδ2 . Let us
consider the quotient set ψQ′A = ψ
Q
A/ ≈ and the relation ≺
′ canonically induced
on ψQ′A by the relation ≺ defined on ψ
Q
A . Then, ≺
′ is a partial order (binary,
transitive, antisymmetric and reflexive) on ψQ′A . Moreover, the mapping f in-
duces an order isomorphism of (ψQ′A ,≺
′) onto (SE ,⊆). Hence (ψ
Q′
A ,≺
′) is an
(orthomodular) lattice, in which lattice operations N ′, K ′ and AQ′ are defined
which correspond to the operations ⊥, ⋓ and ⋒ defined on SE , respectively.
These operations are related to the connectives N , K and AQ by the following
equations.
N ′[δ]≈ = [Nδ]≈,
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[δ1]≈K
′[δ1]≈ = [δ1Kδ1]≈,
[δ1]≈A
Q′[δ1]≈ = [δ1A
Qδ1]≈.
We have thus obtained a pragmatic structure (ψQ′A ,≺
′) = (ψQ′A , N
′,K ′, AQ′)
which is isomorphic to the quantum logic (SE ,⊆) = (SE ,
⊥ ,⋓,⋒) introduced in
Sect. 4.3. These two structures can then be identified.
6 Conclusions
The results stated at the end of the preceding section are philosophically impor-
tant. They imply that QL can be considered as a pragmatic structure, formaliz-
ing the properties of empirical justification in quantum mechanics rather than a
notion of quantum truth specific of this theory. This conclusion agrees with the
general integrationist perspective (global pluralism) mentioned in Sect. 1, ac-
cording to which nonstandard logics are interpreted as theories of metalinguistic
notions different from truth, thus avoiding incompatibility with classical notions
and preserving the globality of logic. Our aims in Sect. 1 are thus reached. Of
course this achievement has a price. Indeed, if one adopts a standard realistic
or a modal interpretation of quantum mechanics, one can reconcile QL with a
classical notion of truth at the expense of weakening this notion by introducing
partial truth assignments. A complete reconciliation of QL with classical logic is
possible only by accepting the reinterpretation of quantum probabilities intro-
duced by the ESR model. In any case, our results provide a further example of
the explanatory power of the (generalized) pragmatic extension LP of classical
logic, in which different logical systems may coexist without conflicting because
they are interpreted as formalizing different metalinguistic concepts.
It remains to observe that conclusions similar to ours have been drawn in
[Garola, 1992, 2008] and [Garola and Sozzo, 2013]. In particular, in the last
of these papers a classical predicate calculus L(x) is constructed and enriched
by introducing a physical preorder (which is implied by the logical order but
generally does not coincide with it) induced by the theory-dependent notion
of “certainly true in a state S”. A structure isomorphic to QL is then recov-
ered by selecting a subset of sentences of L(x) that are verifiable according to
quantum mechanics and adding a physically justified orthocomplementation.6
Our present approach, however, is more general in several senses. Firstly, it is
constructed in such a way to allow an orthodox physical interpretation of the
truth values that are assigned to the radical formulas of LP . On the contrary,
the approach in [Garola and Sozzo, 2013] introduces a classical semantics on
6It is noteworthy that similar procedures also lead to recover classical Boolean structures
whenever the language of classical mechanics is considered, which implies that the logical
and the physical order coincide and all sentences are assumed to be verifiable. Moreover
structures isomorphic to QL can be obtained in this classical case if the notion of verification
is suitably restricted, so that only some sentences turn out to be verifiable. This result proves
that QL occurs because of the notion of verification that is adopted and does not characterize
quantum mechanics, consistently with a known position of some scholars concerned with the
foundations of quantum mechanics [Aerts, 1988, 1991, 1995, 1998, 1999].
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L(x) which has a physical meaning only if one adopts the reinterpretation and
generalization of quantum mechanics propounded by the ESR model. Secondly,
the procedures in [Garola and Sozzo, 2013] are, paraphrasing Salmon’s classi-
fication of scientific explanations [Salmon, 1989], “bottom-up”, because they
explain QL in terms of basic logical and physical structures. On the contrary,
our present procedures are “up-down”. Indeed, they are based on the (general-
ized) language LP , which has a pragmatic interpretation that does not depend
on specific physical theories and is suitable for recovering different non-standard
logics by specifying different notions of proof. Hence our interpretation of QL
as a pragmatic structure constitutes an instantiation of a general method in a
special case (empirical quantum proof).
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